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MONROE E. PRICE
Religious Communication and Its Relation 
to the State: Comparative Perspectives 
1. Introduction
It is fairly clear that there is a need, in terms of global and comparative 
perspectives, to explore alternative schemes for thinking about the role of 
the state with respect to religious communication. The predominant mode 
of discussion, especially in the comfortable discourse of modern Western 
traditions, is to lodge analysis in terms of free speech and human rights. 
Increasingly, however, that discourse is insuffi cient descriptively and in 
danger of irrelevance prescriptively. Religious or implicitly religious speech 
is infl ected with new power, as if it were a form of violence itself. Religious 
communication becomes a transcendent force with a claim to authority 
higher than that of other forms of speech. Religious speech, because it has 
the capacity to motivate large-scale attitudes, raises important questions as to 
the manner by which national and global identities are formed. As ‘religion’ 
becomes an integral aspect of defi ning international oppositions and threats 
to national security, how states think about the propagation of messages by 
religious groups changes greatly. 
 Thus, there is substantial change in the perceived public importance of 
religion and the exercises of communication that relate to it. But modes 
of thinking about religion and speech, religion and the state, and religion 
and great publics have not suffi ciently taken into consideration the new 
realities. The consequence is puzzlement about how to deal with the national 
and geopolitical aspects of religious ideas. In the last decade, especially, 
the privileging, banning, or subsidizing of religious communication has 
accelerated, but the question remains whether the paradigms for dealing with 
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this subject matter area should be altered. It is impossible to engage in a broad 
conceptualization in this paper; my more modest goal is to look at a variety 
of contexts where the sponsorship or restriction of religion is encouraged or 
restricted by the state and to do so in a comparative way. What I hope to begin 
to do in this paper is to map a few new modes of looking at the relationship 
between the state and what might be called ‘religious communication’. 
 The well-known paradigm that serves as the baseline is one in which 
‘religious speech’ is a subcategory of a larger, identifi able category called 
‘speech’ and one where, under international standards, maximum protection 
is to be afforded. The inspiration of this baseline of ‘modernization’ is the 
Enlightenment and its ideal of the secular free-thinker able to speak and act 
independently of constraint by government. Linked is the idea of government 
acting independently of a dominant religion or of religion acting effectively 
as if it were government. Equally basic is the principle that a dissenting, 
innovative, or competing religion can assert itself without state interference. 
The modern project can be seen as honoring societies more plural than 
monopolistic, so that power among religions (as well as political parties) is 
diffused. Another aspect of the model – refl ected in the notion of government 
independence – is a suffi cient separation so that religions should prosper 
without the smothering hand of the state expressed in various establishing 
ways (or, in the weaker statement of the model, that such assistance should 
be non-discriminatory). A rather new addition to the core is the right of one 
person or a set of individuals to seek to convince others to adopt a certain 
religion, part of the right of an individual to choose or profess a religion (or 
none at all) and the corollary right to resist conversion, including the right to 
be sure that unfair power is not used in a proselytizing process.1 
 All this is within the traditional mode of thinking about these questions. 
What is needed is to open or invigorate this discourse through questioning 
assumptions that undergird the traditional paradigms. The great global 
narratives, said to involve massive battles for ‘hearts and minds’, are being 
used to present a geopolitics in which religion is an instrument of power and 
sometimes a verbal scabbard, sheathing agendas of politics and force. In the 
crunch of these global narratives, not only are there more strongly defi ned 
and aggressive efforts to extend particular religious spheres of infl uence, but 
there are unusually framed struggles between aspects of religion and more 
secular forces such as democratization. How these grand narratives play 
themselves out must contribute to the redefi nition of free speech and religion. 
1 We can already begin to see the various complexities, some of which mirror complexities 
in other circumstances. For example, problems of comparing free speech for individuals with 
free speech for corporate actors fi nd a counterpart here. One kind of analysis may be needed 
to protect the free religious speech of individuals against the state or even against the force of 
a dominant organized religion. Another kind of analysis may fi t where one seeks to establish 
the free speech of dissenting or novel religions in a context of monopoly or near-monopoly 
religions.
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With the stakes so high, it is hardly surprising that governments increasingly 
become involved (no matter what their constitutions say) in addressing the 
impact of religious activity. Religion becomes a factor in national security, 
both offensively and defensively. This process signifi es the reconsideration 
of religion as a dominating factor in realpolitik of the unifi cation of state 
and religion. And this means rethinking religious communication and its 
relationship to the state and the individual in relationship to religion and 
speech (including a redefi nition in which the individual is subordinated to the 
state). 
2. Religion and the Market for Loyalties
In an article entitled The Market for Loyalties: The Electronic Media and the 
Global Competition for Allegiances,2 I posited a market in which there are a 
variety of producers of allegiances (political parties, movements, ideologies, 
religions). These producers are competitors and behave in the same way, 
sometimes with as much rancor and skill as do advertisers and producers of 
loyalties to commercial goods. They combine to limit competition and use 
governmental power to sustain their infl uence and maintain or expand market 
share. Cartels of producers of allegiances are abundant. We know too well 
circumstances in which the state seeks to enforce a monopoly in the production 
of allegiances. Our ideal model of a ‘marketplace of ideas’ assumes ease of 
entry and many players existing in a kind of equilibrium of abundance. But 
this formula is the exception. Governments, sometimes independent of such 
producers or at their behest, intervene to maintain cartels or to force or permit 
openings (sometimes small, sometimes radical) to allow new entrants in a 
measured way. And at times, events occur or technologies are found that 
upend the historic efforts to establish and nourish existing cartels. These 
arrangements exist through the actions of individual states or are organized by 
regions or aggregated spheres of infl uence. Strong (or innovative) producers 
of allegiances (or state sponsors of such producers) seek to intervene to change 
the rules or take other actions to break an existing cartel or existing balance 
where they seek to establish a stronger foothold. 
 Religion has always been a major aspect of markets for loyalties (perhaps 
religions were, in some places, the original market players), but how the 
strength and infl uence of religions – as entrants in the competition for loyalties 
– comes into national and global debates changes over time, and those changes 
worth examining.3 For example, the naming of belief and practice of religion 
2 M. Price, The Market for Loyalties: The Electronic Media and the Global Competition for 
Allegiances, 104 Yale L. J. 667 (1994).
3 See S. Shapiro, Ministering To the Upwardly Mobile Muslim, New York Times Magazine, 30 
April 2006, at 46.
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as a particular right supplies a basis for breaking an existing monopoly or 
oligopoly. Examination of how ‘rights’ come to be articulated is one way, but 
hardly the only way, to analyze these shifts. Scoring how a state ranks, or how 
the international community performs, in terms of recognition of rights does 
not capture the changing religio-political map of the world. And when looking 
at these markets, another important distinction can be made. One can contrast 
competition among religious providers (say, Catholics and Protestants) or 
competition between (at least some) religious providers and other producers 
of allegiances (e.g., Christian fundamentalists versus those favoring a secular 
approach to the world). Analytically, one can examine the market for loyalties 
as if it plays itself out solely or primarily within a particular state, with that state 
having or purporting to have control (e.g., arguments over church and state in 
the US); as compared with a market for loyalties in which the infl uences are 
strong across national boundaries (most evident in areas of intense missionary 
activity, as in parts of Africa, or in times of confl ict, as with the Balkans).
 We are more familiar with markets for loyalties within the boundaries of 
a state. One could think of three historic patterns of religion in the single-
state context: a state coupled with a monopoly established religion, a state 
constitutionally and in fact dedicated to plural religious practices and a 
commitment to separation, and a state that is ruthlessly anti-religious and 
that asserts and imposes secularism as a replacement for religion.4 Each of 
these paradigms would imply a different view of religious communication. 
Taking just one element of regulation, relating to religious broadcasting, the 
implications might be as follows. A monopoly state – one with an established 
and dominant religion – may either preclude any other religions from the 
use of powerful electronic media, or provide the established religion with a 
monopoly itself (a variety on this would be a strong and small cartel). Over 
time, where a monopoly or established religion is the centerpiece, a slow 
atrophying may occur because of the lack of a discipline of competition. The 
second model might be thought of as carrying out pluralism in broadcasting 
(see the Netherlands example, below). Rules would exist, perhaps even 
limiting new entrants, but the notion would be to be inclusive, fair, and 
nondiscriminatory, at least as to the historic players. The third model would 
seek to maximize secularism by looking at religions as fi erce competitors 
whose role in the public sphere should be minimized, if not prohibited or 
subject to degradation (Turkey and possibly the Soviet Union spring to mind). 
There, religious broadcasting would be severely limited if not prohibited. 
 These are nation-based ways of thinking about the market for loyalties and 
the place of religion or religions within them.5 Much of the way we think about 
4 This line of thinking grew out of a conversation with Professor Brendan O’Leary, University 
of Pennsylvania.
5 See A. Rice, Enemy’s Enemy, Evangelicals v. Muslims in Africa, New Republic, 9 August 
2004, at 18.
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regulation and the role of the state has arisen in this nation-based construct. 
Of course, the place of religion in the building of allegiances has always had 
transnational aspects. But today, obvious by these extensions and modes 
of altering allegiances have become increasingly intense and transnational. 
Christian proselytizing is measured through continents and regions. The move 
toward an Islamist Restoration has global implications. States certainly seek 
to maintain the patterns of control that have long existed, indeed maintain the 
monopoly or oligopoly that characterized the past and could be construed as a 
signifi cant part of national identity. In terms of the models described above, the 
state-legitimated monopoly conferred on a dominant religion may be harder to 
sustain (though that is far from always the outcome), and a carefully planned 
and balanced pluralism is equally at risk. Maintaining strict secularism where 
religions can so easily gain entrance also appears problematic. 
 There is a small literature that conceptualizes religious competition in 
market terms and, at times, suggests the regulatory implications. Rodney 
Smith writes that, 
especially where they are in a majority, nonproselyting religions often seek to 
use broadcasting regulation to limit the capacity of minority religions to gain 
converts from among adherents of the majority religion. Majority religions do 
so by regulating broadcasting in a manner that limits the access of minority 
religions to the media or by increasing their own share of time on the media.6 
Finke and Iannaccone use a supply-side approach as part of an economic 
analysis of the growth of religious organizations. They generally deny that the 
growth of various new faiths (they focus on historical religions in the United 
States) ought to be attributed to “altered desires, perceptions, or circumstances,” 
namely, changes in demand.7 Their approach deprecates the idea that shifts in 
large scale adhesions are due to changed concepts of the world or altered 
notions of self and society. Their goal is to challenge the traditional assumption 
that trends in religious practice come from altered circumstances, increased 
poverty, or other changes in outlook. Largely focusing on the US experience, 
they assert that “the most signifi cant changes in American religion derive from 
shifting supply, not shifting demand. Colonial revivalists, Asian cult leaders 
and contemporary televangelists all prospered when regulatory changes gave 
them freer access to America’s religious marketplace.”8 For them, it is changes 
in the incentives and opportunities facing religious producers that account for 
expansion or contraction among faiths, not “some sudden shift in the material 
or psychological state of the populace.”9 
6 R. Smith, Regulating Religious Broadcasting: Some Comparative Refl ections, 1996 BYU L. 
Rev. 905.
7 R. Finke & L. R. Iannaccone, Supply-Side Explanations for Religious Change, 527 Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences (AAAPSS) 27-39 (1993).
8 Id., at 27.
9 Id., at 28.
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 They would, if pressed, generalize this assumption into the global context. 
If Fink and Iannaccone are correct, and their analysis can be scaled up, 
then global changes in the hold of belief systems are a function of shifts in 
technology and regulatory patterns: in supply and access rather than in appeal 
or content. Perhaps this changes at a given moment: there is a tipping point in 
acceptance or decline that supersedes these more technical explanations. And, 
perhaps, there are exceptional moments, tulipmanias, where a religion (or an 
ideology) achieves a sharp upswing in its place in the market for loyalties. 
 Finke and Iannaccone attribute signifi cance to the governmental role:
The market model views churches and their clergy as religious producers 
who choose the characteristics of their product and the means of marketing 
it. Consumers in turn choose what religion, if any, they will accept and 
how extensively they will participate in it. As in other markets, government 
regulation can profoundly affect the producers’ incentives, the consumers’ 
options and the aggregate equilibrium.10
In a stroll through US religious history, they claim, among other things, that 
“the so-called Great Awakenings” of the period from 1730-1760 and 1800-
1830 succeeded because of religious campaigns that arose “when restrictions 
on new sects and itinerant preaching diminished. Early American religion 
fl ourished in response to religious deregulation.”11 They speak about the 
Grand Itinerant, George Whitefi eld, whose efforts to spread his message was 
resisted by more established preachers. One group of Congregational ministers 
complained that “for a Minister to invade another’s Province and preach in his 
Charge without his leave, is disorderly and tends to Confusion, and hurteth 
the Work of God.”12 The natural response, in these circumstances, is to seek 
to restrict entry through regulation. Finke and Iannaccone call the itinerant 
preachers “unregulated competitors in the religious marketplace, foreign 
competition that threatened the privileges and profi ts of a domestic cartel.” In 
that early time, the Connecticut legislature prohibited unlicensed propagators 
from “preaching in any parish without the approval of the minister of that 
parish.”13 
 A more recent and modest example within the US refl ects the process of 
cartelization and its casual enforcement. In a 1935 article, Radio and Religion, 
Spencer Miller recounted the way the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) 
(and others) dealt with the public interest obligations and opportunities 
established by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) with respect 
to religion.14 Soon after the NBC was created in 1927 (and in anticipation 
of government concern), it formed an Advisory Committee to guide in the 
10 Id., at 28.
11 Id., at 29.
12 Id., at 31.
13 Id., at 32.
14 S. Miller, Jr., Radio and Religion, 177 AAAPSS 135-140 (January 1935).
 RELIGIOUS COMMUNICATION AND ITS RELATION TO THE STATE: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 91
development of programs in various fi elds including religious broadcasting. 
A standing committee was formed to provide time or opportunities, and they 
did so for the benefi t of the ‘three great religious communions’ and no more. 
Among the principles adopted were the following:
The national broadcasting company will serve only the central or national 
agencies of great religious faiths, as for example, the Roman Catholics, the 
Protestants, and the Jews, as distinguished from individual churches or small 
group movements where the national membership is comparatively small.
 The religious message broadcast should be nonsectarian and 
nondenominational in appeal. 
 The religious message broadcast should be of the widest appeal; presenting 
the broad claims of religion, which not only aid in building up the personal 
and social life of the individual but also aid in popularizing religion and the 
church.15
This approach, ‘establishment’-oriented and exclusive, extended to all the 
networks and, with tacit governmental approval, remained the dominant 
approach for decades. An oft-told story about how televangelism came to 
be such a strong force today is the reaction of non-establishment religious 
movements to this audio-visual cartel and the campaign to change the rules. 
The dominant religions – working with the established networks – sought to 
maintain their cartel. In defi ance, and with populist pressure on Congress, 
the excluded groups created a competing lobbying organization and mastered 
the licensing opportunities provided by the Federal Communications Act.16 
Of course, it is only against the political structure in the US and the relative 
transparency of decision-making that this story can be told in so full a 
fashion. 
 The conscious role that the FCC plays in the problem of market entry – 
and the switch in the ideology of approach – is exemplifi ed by a much more 
recent example of regulation. What gave birth to the issue was the application 
for a transfer of license from a traditional public service broadcaster, WQED 
Pittsburgh, to an entity, Cornerstone TeleVision, Inc., that was known for 
its religious use of frequencies. On 29 December 1999, the FCC released a 
‘additional guidance’ in the face of concerns that the station would be largely 
‘religious’ in the face of an historic reservation of noncommercial channels 
15 Id.
16 The story is told in various places: J. K. Hadden, Regulating Religious Broadcasting: 
Some Old Patterns and New Trends, in J. E. Wood, Jr. & D. Davis (Eds.), The Role of 
Government in Monitoring and Regulating Religion in Public Life (1992); J. K. Hadden & 
A. Shupe, Televangelism: Power and Politics on God’s Frontier (1988). As to whether there 
was a deliberate effort by mainstream religious organizations to keep evangelical programs off 
the primary airwaves, Hoover demurs. He argues that the evangelicals insisted on preaching 
doctrine, while the mainstream groups went along with an FCC and network preference for 
‘broad truths.’ S. Hoover & D. K. Wagner, History and Policy in American Broadcast Treatment 
of Religion, 19 Media, Culture and Society 7-27 (1997). 
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for general educational purposes.17 To put it in ‘market for loyalties’ terms 
(or even Finke and Iannaccone terms), one might say that greater access for 
religious producers of allegiances was being made available through the 
potential opening up of these noncommercial or public service channels. At 
any rate, addressing concerns about shifting the balance (here between the 
religious and the secular), the majority of the FCC added these words to the 
grant of permission:
[…] not all programming, including programming about religious matters, 
qualifi es as “general educational” programming. For example, programming 
primarily devoted to religious exhortation, proselytizing, or statements of 
personally-held religious views and beliefs generally would not qualify as 
“general educational” programming. […] The reserved television channels are 
intended “to serve the educational and cultural broadcast needs of the entire 
community to which they are assigned,” and to be responsive to the overall 
public as opposed to the sway of particular political, economic, social or 
religious interests.18
The fashioning of this content-related rule gave rise to a great outcry and 
pressure. In contrast to the 1930s and 1940s, the balance of political force and 
power to mobilize had shifted, with greater strength among those who sought 
more openness to religious producers. So great was the heat on the FCC 
that a month later, the ‘additional guidance’ was dropped and the previous 
decision amended. Harold Furchgott-Roth, refl ecting on the change before a 
Congressional hearing said: 
[…] the Commission’s “additional guidance” raised the specter of discrimination 
against certain broadcasters on the basis of their religious message. No other 
noncommercial, educational broadcasters, of course, were subject to the “no 
exhortation” or “no statement of personally-held views” standard announced in 
the Order. In Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, the Supreme Court made 
clear that once government opens up an avenue for expression, it may not deny 
access to those with religious editorial viewpoints simply because of those 
viewpoints. Conversely – and contrary to the assertion of some in the WQED 
majority – the Court also made clear that allowing such groups to speak on the 
same basis as others in order to avoid a violation of the Free Speech Clause 
does not, in turn, violate the Establishment Clause. 19
Gloria Tristani, one of the Commissioners who had voted for the guidance, 
had a different perception of what had occurred: 
17 WQED Pittsburgh v. Cornerstone Television, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order of the 
FCC of 15 December 1999, FCC 99-393, at 43.
18 Id., at 44.
19 Testimony of Commissioner Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth before the Subcommittee on 
Telecommunication, Trade, and Consumer Protection, Hearing on H.R. 3525, the Religious 
Broadcasting Freedom Act and H.R. 4201, the Noncommercial Broadcasting Freedom of 
Expression Act of 2000, 13 April 2000.
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Then the pressure campaign began. It was alleged that the Commission was 
barring certain religious programming from the reserved channels. Not true 
– the Commission simply held that not all religious programming would count 
toward the “primarily educational” requirement. Then it was alleged that the 
Commission was somehow restricting religious speech, or engaging in a prior 
restraint. Again, not true – the decision only dealt with the small number of 
television channels set aside for noncommercial educational use. Religious 
broadcasters are free to broadcast whatever they wish on commercial channels. 
Indeed, Cornerstone has been broadcasting unimpeded on a commercial 
television channel in Pittsburgh since 1978. In this case, Cornerstone was 
seeking a special privilege from the government – the right to broadcast on 
a channel reserved primarily for public education. The government may 
selectively promote certain speech (e.g., public educational speech) without 
thereby abridging other types of speech (e.g., religious speech). Perhaps the 
most disturbing charge leveled against the Commission is that its decision 
refl ects an “anti-religion bias” at the agency. I reject and resent this type of 
attack, reminiscent of a witch-hunt.20
Religious broadcasters, the fi rst majority was implying, have the use 
of commercial channels. There was no desire to say, explicitly, that the 
noncommercial reservations were for secular purposes (and in a deep 
constitutional, though not a pragmatic, sense that would be an error). The 
Cornerstone decision played with allocation of tools of persuasion in the 
market for loyalties. 
 Too much of the literature on what might be called religious communication 
focuses on the history of religious broadcasting in the United States. This has 
been supplemented with histories of televangelism. There is even the sense of 
television itself as a religious experience. But there is something wanting about 
these analyses. They tend to look at religious broadcasting as a segmented, 
separated phenomenon, as an outlier in the history of broadcasting, without 
looking at it as an important component of history itself. Religious broadcasting 
is an oddity, a place of fraud and deceit, a place not mediated by the broadcast 
executive class, and not part of the standard story of broadcasting, networks, 
entertainment, and mainstream news. Increasingly, in the twenty-fi rst century, 
religious communication is at the center of global concerns. 
 To turn outside the United States, an intriguing and complex example of 
government-enforced cartelization of religious communication involves the 
Netherlands. There the mode for achieving it was pillarization, the way the 
Dutch (and also the Belgians) have dealt with a specifi c multicultural society. 
Various aspects of life: churches, political parties, trade unions, hospitals, 
scouting organizations, broadcasters, and newspapers were divided into pillars. 
In the Netherlands, there were originally three pillars (Catholic, Protestant, and 
Socialist), but over time, particularly in the broadcasting arena, there was a 
fragmentation and a variety of entities, including atheists, gained pillar status. 
20 WQED Pittsburgh v. Cornerstone Television, Inc., Order on Reconsideration of 28 January 
2000, FCC 00-25.
94 MONROE E. PRICE 
The associations fought entry by entities that would strenuously compete with 
them (usually, with respect to broadcasting, secular and commercial outsiders 
– or pirates). Ultimately, technology (and changes in European Union law 
commanding access) spelled the decline of the cartel and the ready entry of 
competitors into the previously tight market for allegiances.
 Another signifi cant example of cartelization occurred in Lebanon after its 
civil war of the 1970s. During the confl ict and in the absence of state power, a 
large number of radio and television stations were created in what amounted 
to a proliferated open market. As part of the pacted settlement, the number 
of television stations was dramatically reduced, and access to audiences was 
restricted to each of the four major militia and religious participants, including 
Christians, Sunnis, and Shiites. Many stations there, including Hezbollah’s 
al-Manar, owe their existence to this settlement. These were agreements of 
exclusion as well as inclusion. This cartel was affected by the rise of satellite 
broadcasting in the Middle East and by international efforts to affect the 
internal market, especially the broadcasting of al-Manar.21
 Just as important as these national efforts to establish and enforce market 
shares among religious producers of allegiances are efforts that cross borders. 
These require more scholarly attention. Examples of such transnational 
interventions are abundant. One could look at this issue in terms of the impact 
of satellite on the ability of fundamentalist imams (exiled to Germany) to 
reach audiences in Turkey and alter or intensify the profi le of religious practice 
there. In Turkey, regulation was attempted (bans on satellite dishes), but it was 
insuffi ciently coercive. Another well-known example is the adaptation of the 
audiocassette as a mode of spreading intensity of allegiance to fundamental 
ayatollahs in the Shah’s Iran. These are similar to examples of technology 
performing the role of deregulation – as ways of increasing the effectiveness 
of supply, where changes in technologies serve as powerful deregulating 
agents. Turning again to Finke and Iannaccone, and applying their analysis to 
large scale refi guring of religious markets, several issues could be identifi ed: 
What relationship is there between new communication technologies 
and changes in the religious landscape? What effect has deregulation of 
restrictions on missionaries had on the rate of conversion? To what extent 
have restrictions on proselytizing maintained market share in Russia for the 
Orthodox Church? What has been the overall impact of the growth of Middle 
East satellite services in terms of regional allegiances? Who controls access to 
the satellite transponders that serve the region, and how has that gate-keeping 
function been exercised? To what extent are some of the entrants (al Arabiya, 
21 Al-Manar was created by Hezbollah in 1991, with fi nancial support from Iran. In 1997, the 
Lebanon government granted it one of only fi ve broadcasting licenses, under pressure from 
Syria. The US, France, and Spain have all banned its broadcasts; in 2004, the US placed al-
Manar on the Terrorist Exclusion List, blocking its broadcasts to North America. See A. Jorisch, 
Hizbullah TV, 24/7, 11 Middle East Quarterly 20 (2004), http://www.meforum.org/article/583. 
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for example) meant to be secularized balancing forces? Changes cannot be 
attributed to technological and regulatory change alone. An implication of the 
Fink and Iannaccone analysis would be to consider which producer is most 
adept at using the new technologies, i.e., of expanding supply to nourish the 
ideological product. 
 To suggest the geopolitics of these cross-boundary efforts, it is useful to 
quote the former US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. He was hinting 
at this new reality in a 2006 talk to the Council on Foreign Relations. He said 
the following: 
Our enemies have skillfully adapted to fi ghting wars in today’s media age, but 
for the most part we – our country – our government, has not adapted. Consider 
that the violent extremists have established “media relations committees” – 
these are terrorists and they have media relations committees that meet and talk 
about strategy, not with bullets but with words. They’ve proven to be highly 
successful at manipulating the opinion elites of the world. […] They know 
that communications transcend borders – and that a single news story, handled 
skillfully, can be as damaging to our cause and helpful to theirs, as any other 
method of military attack. […] Our federal government is really only beginning 
to adapt our operations to the 21st century.22 
Secretary Rumsfeld was not discussing religious groups, per se, nor was he 
discussing systematic modes of affecting the market for loyalties through 
technology and law. This was more of a burst of reaction to altered realities, 
to the recognition that the market had signifi cantly changed and it was not 
clear to those in the status quo ante how to react to those changes. He was 
discussing skill in designing the message, not skill in dealing with an altered 
technological environment. He was not discussing regulatory impositions to 
restrict or favor entry of a particular religious group. What was critical was 
comparative expertise in exploiting changed circumstances. And these changed 
circumstances had important consequences in the market for loyalties.23 In 
short, inappropriate or differential adaptation to the technologies leads to 
differential consequences in the market for allegiances.
3. State Regulation and Proselytism
There are many ways of describing state intervention in the religious-
communication market for loyalties. In this section, I will focus on an area 
of discourse that has historically had transnational dimensions: control of 
campaigns for conversion (from barbarian to Christian, from one religion to 
another, from sects or divisions within a religion to alternatives). These are 
22 Speech by US Sec. of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to Council on Foreign Relations, 17 
February 2006, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2006/sp20060217-12574.html.
23 See further the Report of the US Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic 
Communication. http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf. 
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often seen through the prism of proselytizing and its regulation. Proselytizing 
is a useful technique to study. It has two faces. On the one hand, it is speech 
at its most central, the articulation of ideas most important to the speaker 
and possibly of redemptive signifi cance to the receiver. On the other hand, 
proselytizing can be perceived as disruptive or subversive of existing 
arrangements among providers of allegiances. We can look at practices 
concerning proselytization as an example of state and non-state behavior in 
the market for loyalties. 
 There are states that regulate conversion practices formally or informally 
to maintain existing shares, including near monopoly status, in the religious 
cartel. Informal agreements exist between or among religious entities that 
tolerate some degree of conversion advocacy but also suggest limits on the 
practice. Greece, Russia, and the states of Central Asia all provide case studies 
of regulation of efforts to convert. There are examples of one state trying to 
infl uence conversion regulation in another state. The regulation of proselytizing 
practices can be studied by looking at particular religious contexts. Focusing on 
evangelical Christian churches or church-agents generally, different contexts 
yield varying regulatory environments: China, with its current emphasis on 
secularism; Russia, with its Orthodox tradition;24 and the Middle East, where 
there are efforts to convert Muslims to Christianity.25 Or one can look across 
national boundaries at specifi c technologies of conversion. Broadcasting 
provides a specifi c instance (not necessarily the most effective). We can think 
of regulation of religious broadcasting as turning, in large part, on how the 
regulator sees the channel, i.e., as undergirding or reaffi rming religious faith 
among those who hold it, or, rather, as a more aggressive agent of change, 
designed primarily to encourage change or conversion. 
 Here, as elsewhere in the regulation of religious communication, 
international norms become a factor in setting limits (effective or not) on 
state action. And just for that reason, the way in which the international 
norms are constructed becomes itself an element in shaping the market for 
loyalties. An overriding and effective norm that privileges the right to convert 
can be a victory for the freedom to speak and believe, but it also can favor 
certain religions over others and the process of change over a commitment to 
24 In Russia, there are mutual arrangements between religious entities (or attempts for 
agreements). Alexis II, the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, issued his notion of what 
constituted appropriate understandings with his counterpart in Rome: “Cooperation with the 
Roman Catholic Church must exclude the forms of proselytism (i.e., the Vatican spreading its 
infl uence to what the ROC sees as its canonical territory) that have been pursued recently.” 
Russian Patriarch: Cooperation Does not Imply Proselyte Activities, RIA Novosti, 8 June 
2005.
25 See for one earlier survey, J. Witte, Jr. & R. C. Martin (Eds.), Sharing the Book: Religious 
Perspectives on the Rights and Wrongs of Proselytism (1999). See also T. Stahnke, Proselytism 
and the Freedom to Change Religion in International Human Rights Law, 1999 BYU L. Rev. 
251, at 289-298 (discussing cases from Europe and Pakistan). 
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stable power arrangements. In this way, defending or qualifying the right to 
proselytize (or the right to be converted or to hear arguments for change) alters 
the power of states to maintain a given cartel in the market for loyalties. By 
guaranteeing rights to receive and impart information, a norm is established, 
quite obviously, that encourages greater competition and somewhat favors 
religions that are committed to active conversion. In examining human 
rights, one needs to understand the various perspectives. Is there, under the 
human rights regimes, a clear individual right to choose whatever religion 
one wants (a right to commit apostasy, for example)? Is there a right to be 
free from (coercive or manipulative) efforts to proselytize, and under what 
circumstances can the state limit that right?26
 The language of the human rights documents is deceptively simple. Article 
18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
provides:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his 
choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, 
practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have 
or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, 
order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
Section 2 seems to limit the right of proselytizers to use “coercion” as a means 
of inducing conversion or exercise of “choice.” This has led to a discourse, 
including in the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, of what 
should be considered coercion. The ICCPR had been amended on this issue 
differentiating it from the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The 
“religious freedom” in the 1948 version explicitly included the freedom to 
“change” one’s religion, and in the later version (above) the word “change” 
disappeared. Freedom became the “freedom to have or to adopt” a religion 
or belief. Perhaps this was a subtle effort – under pressure from newly 
decolonized states to make it clear that maintaining religious beliefs was a 
value equivalent to altering them. 
 Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or 
in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or 
belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
26 For one approach to these questions, see Stahnke, id., at 251. 
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 Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Note that Article 9 has the “freedom to change” language that was altered in the 
ICCPR. Note also that both the ICCPR and the European Convention provide 
(in the usual form) for limitations on the means of “manifesting” one’s religion 
and, likely, activities related to proselytizing are such a manifestation, often 
a central one. The issue then would be under what circumstances, when all 
other requirements are met (prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic 
society), limits on this kind of activity might be justifi ed. Specifi c attitudes 
toward conversion appear in Arab states. Article 10 of the Cairo Declaration 
on Human Rights in Islam of 1990 states that “It is prohibited to exercise any 
form of compulsion on man or to exploit his poverty or ignorance in order to 
convert him to another religion or to atheism.” 27 
 An example of this problem is a series of cases from Greece (where 
proselytizing of certain kinds is banned). In the case of Larissis,28 offi cers 
in the airforce argued that their prosecution, conviction, and punishment 
for proselytism violated Article 9 of the European Convention. The Court 
acknowledged that the government had interfered with the offi cers’ rights 
to “freedom […] to manifest [their] religion or belief.”29 Looking at the 
conditions in which such interference was authorized, the Court held that it 
had been “prescribed by law” and, more interestingly, had a “legitimate aim,” 
namely, protecting the rights and freedoms of others. The Court also found 
that as far as the measures taken following the proselytizing of airmen under 
their command was concerned, the aim was of preventing disorder in the 
armed forces and thus protecting public safety and order.30
 Was the Greek prosecution “necessary in a democratic society?” Here 
the decision spoke, though obliquely, to the interest of the state in refereeing 
in techniques designed to shift loyalties. First, “while religious freedom is 
primarily a matter of individual conscience, it also implies, inter alia, freedom 
to ‘manifest [one’s] religion,’ including the right to try to convince one’s 
neighbour, for example through ‘teaching.’”31 Still, Article 9 does not “protect 
27 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, 5 August 1990, reprinted in I. Brownlie & 
G. S. Goodwin-Gill (Eds.), Basic Documents on Human Rights 764-769 (2002). See also 
A. E. Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures or a Clash with 
a Construct?, 15 Mich. J. Int’l L. 307, at 329 (1994). Another useful article is L. S. Lehnhof, 
Note & Comment, Freedom of Religious Association: The Right of Religious Organizations to 
Obtain Legal Entity Status Under the European Convention, 2002 BYU L. Rev. 561, at 575.
28 Larissis and Others v. Greece, Judgment of 24 February 1998, 1998 ECHR 13. 
29 Id., at Para. 38 (citing Kokkinakis v. Greece, Judgment of 25 May 1993, 1993 ECHR 20, at 
Para. 36).
30 Id., at Para. 43.
31 Id., at Para. 45 (citing Kokkinakis, supra note 29, at Para. 31).
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improper proselytism, such as the offering of material or social advantage or 
the application of improper pressure with a view to gaining new members 
for a Church.”32 In the case of proselytizing airmen, the Greek government 
contended that the applicants had abused the infl uence they enjoyed as air 
force offi cers and had “committed the acts in question in a systematic and 
repetitive manner. The measures taken against them were justifi ed by the 
need to protect the prestige and effective operation of the armed forces and to 
protect individual soldiers from ideological coercion.”33 
 The Court concluded:
[…] the hierarchical structures which are a feature of life in the armed forces 
may colour every aspect of the relations between military personnel, making it 
diffi cult for a subordinate to rebuff the approaches of an individual of superior 
rank or to withdraw from a conversation initiated by him. Thus, what would 
in the civilian world be seen as an innocuous exchange of ideas which the 
recipient is free to accept or reject, may, within the confi nes of military life, be 
viewed as a form of harassment or the application of undue pressure in abuse 
of power. It must be emphasised that not every discussion about religion or 
other sensitive matters between individuals of unequal rank will fall within 
this category. Nonetheless, where the circumstances so require, States may 
be justifi ed in taking special measures to protect the rights and freedoms of 
subordinate members of the armed forces.34
Larissis demonstrates the potential for international norms to act as a brake on 
the power of states to regulate the market for loyalties (though it also shows 
the complexity of defi ning and applying the human rights norms concerning 
religion and proselytizing). It indicates that there are issues of speech and 
privilege for the proselytizer and, as well, for the object of the proselytizing. 
It suggests the idea of inducement and of context. 
 The issue of regulating conversion practices was and remains an important 
one in Russia and Ukraine and other post-Soviet societies. In 1997, by an 
overwhelming vote, the Russian Parliament passed a bill establishing two 
categories of religious institutions: ‘traditional’ and ‘nontraditional.’ Traditional 
religious communities, legally referred to as ‘religious organizations,’ were 
defi ned as those with an established presence in Russia of fi fteen or more 
years. They included Orthodoxy, Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism. Under 
the statute these entities have – though there is some debate about this – a 
privileged status that allows them, among other things, to run radio and 
television stations. Roman Catholic, Baptist, and breakaway or dissident 
Russian Orthodox denominations, even those that have been in Russia longer 
than fi fteen years, were classifi ed as religious ‘groups,’ and did not have 
the same bundle of rights, including the right to run broadcasting outlets as 
32 Id.
33 Id., at Para. 47.
34 Id., at Para. 51.
100 MONROE E. PRICE 
religious ‘organizations.’35 Though “[…] the stated aim of the law was to 
restrict ‘totalitarian sects’ and ‘dangerous religious cults,’” the law in fact can 
be said to discriminate against less-established religious groups, especially 
Protestant and para-Christian denominations, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses and 
Mormons, by making it diffi cult for them to establish institutional bases.36 
Catherine Wanner, who has written about comparative Russian and Ukrainian 
post-Soviet approaches to this question, places the statute in a national identity 
context:
Ukrainian government and cultural leaders remain obsessed by the growth of 
nontraditional religious groups, meaning neither Orthodox nor Greek-Catholic. 
The growing presence of foreign missionaries in Ukraine buttressing these new 
religious institutions strains the ideal of Ukrainians as a unifi ed ethno-religious 
people and complicates the process of nation building.37 
The desire to rein in proselytism, especially by foreigners and by foreign-
imported nontraditional religious groups, was “palpable” among government 
leaders and even among the population at large.38 
 These approaches can be seen not only as a competition among religious 
entities, but within a larger environment of competition for allegiances. At 
the fall of the Soviet Union, the Protestant fundamentalist denominations 
were perceived as aggressively anti-communist and that gave the movement 
a special immediate appeal. The ideological vacuum left by the collapse of 
communism as a viable worldview and a source of individual and collective 
meaning was replaced, according to Wanner, by a “religious-based orientation 
to self and society.”39 Indeed, Wanner claims, “the disorientation prompted by 
sweeping social change as the Soviet system began to fall apart caused some 
to embrace religion as an anti-Soviet alternative, as a new moral compass 
to guide their ideas and behavior amidst social confusion and economic 
collapse.”40 Perhaps one could call this a non-Finke and Iannaccone approach 
to understanding altered market shares for competing religious entities.
 Many religious groups engage in self-regulation in terms of what are 
considered appropriate in efforts to reach out and expand. Self-regulation (by 
the group or by the cartel) limits the mode of expansion. Religious entities that 
consider proselytizing prohibited, or impose strong ethical limits on activities 
(perhaps more restrictive than would be imposed by the European Court of 
Human Rights), can be compared with those that have a more aggressive 
35 C. Wanner, Missionaries of Faith and Culture: Evangelical Encounters in Ukraine, 63 Slavic 
Review 732, at 738 (2004).
36 Id., at 738. See also, T. J. Gunn, Caesar’s Sword: The 1997 Law of the Russian Federation on 
the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations, 12 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 43, especially 
at 98-99 (1998).
37 Wanner, supra note 35, at 740-741.
38 Id.
39 Id., at 733-734.
40 Id.
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set of standards. Furthermore, host states have different interpretations of 
what constitutes ‘coercion’ in proselytizing activities. Mark Elliott’s essay 
offers a useful insight into the complex legal and ethical questions relating to 
national regulation and self-regulation of proselytizing. Sensitive to national 
regulation that minimizes or eliminates inducements that are inconsistent with 
ethical religious practice, Elliott reaffi rms that [p]roselytism is fi ne if there is 
no “coercion, material inducement, violation of privacy, and preachments to 
captive audiences.” 41 Commenting on post-Soviet Russia, he contends:
Increasingly the xenophobic Russian Orthodox Church sees not only such 
manipulative charity but all Western Protestant compassionate ministries and 
communications as illegitimate material inducements. […] throughout the 
1990s Patriarch Alexis II decried the “massive infl ux” of “well-organized and 
well-fi nanced” missions of “foreign proselytizing faiths,” “zealots” in search of 
“new markets.”42
I have only touched the surface of the debate over active efforts to convert, 
state regulation of them, and the application of international norms to temper 
such state rules. Regulation of proselytizing is a case study in the structuring 
of cartels. It is an example of the complexity of relying on ‘rights’-related 
jurisprudence alone. And an examination of proselytizing opens up what 
might be meant by a broader concept, namely regulation or control of 
religious communication. And it brings us back to the issue of trans-border 
religious broadcasting. How does one map attitudes toward proselytizing onto 
the practices of religious broadcasters? It would be wrong to contend that 
broadcasting is intrinsically manipulative, but some practices of persuasion 
by radio or television – those that promise cures, perhaps those that defraud 
or even exaggerate, may be inconsistent with ethical and legal standards and 
could, possibly, be subject to state regulation as coercive under international 
standards.43
41 M. Elliott, Evangelism and Proselytism in Russia: Synonyms or Antonyms?, 25 International 
Bulletin of Missionary Research 72, at 72 (2001). See also The Declaration on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981).
42 Id., at 73. Elliott concludes, at 74:
[…] two distinct and seemingly antithetical propositions deserve consideration, 
one legal, and one theological. Legally, freedom of conscience, to be genuine, 
must concede the possibility of culturally insensitive, even patently obnoxious 
propagation, as long as it falls short of the aforementioned coercion, material 
inducement, invasion of privacy, and preachments to captive audiences.
 
43 For an early and interesting exploration of these themes in the US context, see J. Weiss, 
Privilege, Posture and Protection: “Religion” in the Law, 73 Yale L. J. 593, at 604 (1964).
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4. International Considerations
One of the interesting aspects of contemporary markets for loyalties – as I 
have mentioned above – is the activity of one state intervening in the market 
of another state. One could ask, for example, whether the United States has a 
stake in the working of the market for religious loyalties in Egypt, Syria, Mali, 
or Indonesia. Partly, this stake is tied to the post-September 11 ‘war on terror’. 
The US, as well as other states, claims to have a strong interest in strengthening 
what is called moderate Islam and diminishing the power of certain strains of 
fundamentalism (certainly what has been called Islamo-fascism by President 
Bush). This is true not only domestically, but globally. The US government 
may seek to modulate Islam and forms of Islamic education in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. Partly, refl ecting domestic political interests, the US may have a 
stake in protecting Christian groups abroad (in Nigeria, China, and elsewhere) 
and protecting the right of Christian missionaries to practice their activities. 
 A curious note to all of this is the American statute: the International 
Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA), the vehicle by which the US refl ects 
a belief in certain universal or human rights principles regarding freedom of 
religion.44 This legislation is relevant because it commits the US government 
(and its State Department and other missions abroad) to further religious 
freedom, as (more or less) defi ned in international documents, with a gloss of 
US interpretation.45 IRFA compels the Executive Branch to document and take 
certain actions where religious freedom is denied in foreign states. The US 
perception of religion in society relies on ‘change of religion’ as a necessary 
right.46 
 The International Religious Freedom Act is interesting for other reasons. 
IRFA can be seen, quite simply, as the projection of standards internationally 
that permit new entrants to arise in foreign markets of loyalties. The Act 
also implies bringing US economic and other power to bear to compel such 
markets to open. Among its mandates are that the Department of State prepare 
national reports that survey how states permit or violate religious freedom 
as it is defi ned or approximated by the law. In these reports, there are a 
variety of related interventions in Islamic states. These include prohibitions 
on proselytizing by non-Muslim religions, prohibitions on having and 
44 An excellent study of IFRA is by D. Decherf, Religious Freedom and Foreign Policy: The 
U.S. International Religious Freedom Act Of 1998, http://www.wcfi a.harvard.edu/fellows/
papers/2000-01/decherf.pdf.
45 This is an interesting set of standards because the US does not adhere to all the relevant 
international agreements that are said to govern interpretation of the statute. 
46 For further insight into IRFA, see M. Fore, Shall Weigh Your God and You: Assessing the 
Imperialistic Implications of the International Religious Freedom Act in Muslim Countries, 52 
Duke L. J. 423 (2003). 
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distributing certain tracts or religious material, prohibitions on the entry of 
foreign clergy, and prohibitions on any private use of broadcast frequencies, 
much less religious ones.
 This prompts a return to the earlier question of the stake one nation has in 
the religious market for loyalties elsewhere. The September 2004 Report of 
the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication suggests 
some of the motivations for US actions: “Islam’s internal and external struggle 
over values, identity, and change is the dominant political arena in which 
strategic communication takes place […] Islam’s crisis must be understood 
as a contest of ideas and engaged accordingly.”47 The Report notes, among 
other things, “the hostile atmosphere in which terrorists act is reinforced 
by religious messages […]; the contest of ideas is taking place not just in 
Arab and other Islamic countries but in the cities and villages of Europe, 
Asia, Africa and the Western Hemisphere.”48 The Science Board sets forth a 
context (one that is subject to active debate with important consequences): the 
large narrative, it claims, is not about terrorism, but debate over an Islamic 
Restoration, the removal of antiquated, dictatorial governments that stand 
in the way of a unifi ed whole because they are keeping hold of dictatorial 
power. Thinking about religion and communication in this ambitious story is 
different from thinking about proselytizing Christians (who may have their 
attention on the next world somewhat more than radically reorganizing the 
political structure of the present one). In this respect, one can ask: What is 
the communications system of the Umma? In a non-secularized environment 
like the Arab Middle East, how does one distinguish between ‘religious 
stations’ and secular counterparts? How are publics being mobilized? What is 
the mode of intervention by those interested in changing them? What exactly 
does freedom of religious communication mean where there is so decisive 
and comprehensive a goal? 
5. Regulation of Religious Communication
Let us take a few other areas affecting religious communication, and try 
to link them to the market for loyalties model. In the United States, one 
current phenomenon is new and more extensive enforcement of ‘indecency 
standards’ by the FCC on radio and television broadcasters, with large fi nes 
and indisputable chilling effects. There are several explanations for this 
increased zest for enforcement. One is that those who are engaged (on the 
Commission and the Congress) actually believe in the standards they are 
47 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication of 23 
September 2004, at 17-18. The report can be found at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-
09-Strategic_Communication.pdf. 
48 Id., at 18.
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enforcing or in their duty to enforce them. A second, often articulated, view 
is that it is part of a different (not essentially religious) market, namely the 
market for votes. But a third explanation is that this is a process of what might 
be called ‘sacralizing’ the commercial broadcasters so as to make them less 
effective competitors, less capable of advancing a particular and captivating 
view of the secular. While commercial broadcasters complain that restricting 
them while allowing cable channels to operate free of indecency standards 
hampers their competitive posture, churches or advocates of a more guarded 
lifestyle can claim to be less endangered. 
 Another interesting example involves new British laws seeking to reduce 
the maligning of religious groups. These laws, especially the Racial and 
Religious Hatred Act of 2006, are provisions criminalizing incitement of 
religious hatred and are designed to protect less dominant religions. How 
does this fi t within the market for loyalties paradigm? This is not the usual 
case where the anti-blasphemy law appears to exist to protect the dominant 
religion. It is rather an instance where there is interest in maintaining a version 
of the status quo of plurality, of giving a sense to an embattled group that their 
market share is not being endangered, preserving stability rather than having 
an environment in which competition is brutal. It is a method of seeking to 
include and protect ‘moderate Islam’ within the cartel, while criminalizing or 
marginalizing more fundamental elements. 
 I have been interested in the regulation of sermons and other religious 
communication as an example of cartelization and the market for loyalties. 
In the post-September 11 world, for example, increased attention is being 
paid internationally to what is taught in madrasas not only in Pakistan, but in 
London and Amsterdam. All of a sudden, states that have benignly neglected 
supervision see themselves as having a positive stake in whether the Islamist 
teaching is ‘moderate’ or extremist. As to sermons, the arrest and deportation 
of the fi erce British imam, Abu Hamza is an example. As one of the British 
papers put it: 
[…] the role of the 47-year-old Egyptian-born cleric in radicalising the men 
responsible for Britain’s worst mainland terror atrocity, the London suicide 
bombings, can be revealed. So, too, can the extraordinary infl uence Hamza 
and the Finsbury Park mosque had over some of the world’s most notorious 
terrorists. For in the six years the hook-handed former mujahidin fi ghter was 
preaching his anti-Western sermons in North London, it became a breeding 
ground for terrorism under his controlling power.49
A favorite example of mine, however, involves the discovery of efforts by 
the Wahhabi sect to obtain a monopoly position among chaplains in prisons, 
and then the effort by the relevant governments to break the monopoly and 
49 D. Williams & B. Taylor, Evil Incarcerated, The Mercury, 11 February 2006.
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virtually ban the sect from participating in that particular market for loyalties. 
Here is an excerpt from US Senator Charles Schumer explaining the context 
during Congressional hearings:
Let me give you an example of how Wahhabism has wreaked some degree 
of havoc in my own backyard in New York State. For 20 years the New York 
State Department of Corrections employed Warith Deen Umar as one of its 
chaplains, eventually appointing him administrative chaplain of the New York 
Department of Correctional Services. A strict believer in Wahhabi Islam, Umar 
was responsible for the hiring and fi ring of all chaplains in the New York State 
prison system, exercising complete control over personnel matters. But last 
year Mr. Umar was banned from ever again entering a New York State prison 
after he incited prisoners against America, specifi cally preaching to inmates 
that the 9/11 hijackers should be remembered as martyrs.
 […] militant Wahhabism is the only form of Islam that is preached to the 
12,000 Muslims in federal prisons. That is against the American view of 
pluralism.50
6. Conclusion
The purpose of this essay has been to sketch some elements of a still woefully 
incomplete theory of regulation of religious communications. But it has also 
been to suggest limitations and defi ciencies in approaches that look solely to 
human rights norms and to rights of speech and belief as ways of thinking about 
religion, media, and society. The argument from the perspective of a market 
for loyalties analysis is more descriptive than normative. It is descriptive 
because it suggests how states engage in shaping and regulating competition 
among religious groups. It approaches the normative as it implies that one 
state’s religious formation, religious education, and religious tendencies have 
a global environment – a serious impact on the political and security structure 
in another state. Because of such externalities, there is a justifi ed interest in 
the international community (and in various affected states) in such national 
formations. These can be articulated in international norms and in unilateral 
actions.
 There are periods of stability and periods of extensive change in particular 
markets for loyalties. Three things now characterize the role of religion in the 
market: there are large scale disturbances undermining stability in signifi cant 
markets (or perhaps just as important, there are changes in perceptions of how 
the market is functioning). Market players are moving from persuasion to the 
use of force. There is the re-association, or stronger association, of religion 
with the political. And fi nally, there is the move from the domestic to the 
transnational. 
50 Senator Schumer, Hearing of the Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security 
Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary, Federal News Service, 26 June 2003.
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Religions compete with each other to gain adherents. They compete with 
other forces (secularism, consumerism, etc.) as well. And, granted that they 
act like competitors in other markets and seek advantages, some competition 
is fair and some is unfair. Communications are central to their enterprise. 
Personal, organizational, and mass communication are the mainstays of this 
competition. These efforts can take the form of mass-producing copies of the 
Bible in the vernacular, or competition can take the form of tens of thousands 
of missionaries in Africa and Latin America. It can take the form of religious 
broadcasting stations reaching across national boundaries. Competitors have 
some common stake (under certain circumstances) in the establishment of 
rules that will allow each of them to function. At least they feel so if there is 
a danger that they will not be dominant. Most competitors like stability and 
often seek rules that preserve their market shares (even if those market shares 
are far from equal). Apocalyptic or messianic religions may feel that their time 
of dominance will certainly come and that actions to accelerate that day are 
more than justifi able. Competitors have a common interest in excluding new 
entrants (this is a corollary of the rule of maintaining market share). These 
factors lead to certain rules in the business world and probably do in religion 
as well. Competitors, and Christian groups in particular, seek the patronage of 
powerful governments to protect them and assure their capacity to function 
throughout the world. 
 And, of course, the making of rules is not up to the competitors alone. 
Consumers, citizens, and ‘buyers’ in the market for allegiances have a stake 
in rules that govern the behavior of the great producers. Consumers may 
have an interest in a set of mechanisms that allows supply to expand, that 
permits innovation, and that allows access to new technologies. In the great 
understanding of Albert O. Hirschman’s Exit, Voice and Loyalty, they have 
an interest in Exit, though the reinforcement of Loyalty is sometimes in the 
mutual interest of seller and buyer.51
 Examining this market and looking at forms that it takes does not abrogate 
the need to examine what might be called ‘fundamental rights,’ such as the 
right of the individual. It does not foreclose the need to determine which state 
interventions are appropriate, but it provides a different context for analysis. 
51 A. O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and 
States (1970).
